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Abstract
We present a novel system of equations to describe the evolution of self-organized
structured societies (biological or human) composed of several trait groups. The sug-
gested approach is based on the combination of ideas employed in the theory of biological
populations, system theory, and utility theory. The evolution equations are defined as
utility rate equations, whose parameters are characterized by the utility of each group
with respect to the society as a whole and by the mutual utilities of groups with respect
to each other. We analyze in detail the cases of two groups (cooperators and defectors) and
of three groups (cooperators, defectors, and regulators) and find that, in a self-organized
society, neither defectors nor regulators can overpass the maximal fractions of about 10%
each. This is in agreement with the data for bee and ant colonies. The classification of
societies by their distance from equilibrium is proposed. We apply the formalism to rank
the countries according to the introduced metric quantifying their relative stability, which
depends on the cost of defectors and regulators as well as their respective population frac-
tions. We find a remarkable concordance with more standard economic ranking based,
for instance, on GDP per capita.
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Introduction
Biological and human social systems have many common features allowing considering them
on common grounds [1]. Actually, biological systems are nothing but particular kinds of social
systems. And vice versa, human societies are particular types of biological systems. Therefore,
the term social system can be applied to both examples of societies.
By definition, a biological or social system is an ensemble of entities characterized by their
structure controlling enduring and relatively stable patterns of relationship between different
groups of the society [2–6]. A social system is structured into several groups defined through
their actions in mutual relations. The characteristics of these relations can change in the long
run but, over limited time spans, they can be treated as fixed.
Any social system exists in an environment that certainly influences its properties. However,
the definition of a social system presupposes that the influence of the environment does not
preclude to identify the system as an entity, with its properties that are more or less specified for
a sufficiently long time during which the system is well defined as such. That is, the notion of a
social system implies that it can be defined as a self-organized entity, with given characteristics,
which lives a sufficiently long time in order to be specified as a particular system. The system
lifetime is much longer that the typical interaction time of its constituents, though it can be
limited from above by the time scales at which the systems characteristics essentially vary. In
that sense, the system lifetime is intermediate, being between the local variation time of its
components and the time of the global change of its properties.
The structure and behavior of different societies, though being specific to each of them,
nevertheless do possess general features that can be classified using mathematical methods,
such that the variety of behaviors can be mapped onto differences in the system parameters
and initial conditions. The concept, that social systems exhibit general reproducible behaviors
and properties, has been emphasized in system theory [1, 7–13], which abstracts and considers
a system as a connected set of interacting parts. The main goal of system theory is to study
general principles of how systems function that can be applied to all types of systems from a
given class.
Bertalanffy [1], who coined the term system theory, emphasized that biological systems have
much in common with human social systems, as well as with separate biological organisms that
can be treated as biological societies of different organs and cells. Dynamical models of biological
organisms are also senseful at intermediate time scales that are longer than the characteristic
functional times of the considered organism constituents, but shorter than the whole organism
lifetimes [14, 15]. This is because during the whole organism lifetime, the parameters of the
system can essentially vary, reflecting the aging processes. In the same way, the dynamical
models of social systems are appropriate for describing intermediate time scales, during which
the system parameters do not essentially change. Generally, the model structure can even be
preserved for rather long times, of the order of the society lifetime, provided that the society
parameters are slowly varying, so that it is possible to separate the system dynamics at different
time scales, resorting to the scale separation approach [16, 17].
The classification, analysis, understanding and prediction of the evolution of biological so-
cieties, including human societies, is an old problem that has been treated in a voluminous
literature starting from Darwin [18,19]. Societies are usually structured into groups represent-
ing particular traits or strategies, so that such groups are termed trait groups, or strategy groups.
Each group consists of agents with a specific trait and/or strategy. Typical group represen-
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tatives are collaborators and defectors. The former collaborate with each other, contributing
to the benefits of the whole society, motivated by self-interest and/or altruistic behavior. The
latter, sometimes called free riders, do not contribute to the society but, on the contrary, exploit
it, benefiting from it without enduring costs or making sacrifices.
Biological explanations of cooperation are based on kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, reputa-
tion or signaling, and mutualism, all of which apply to human as well as nonhuman species [20].
In humans, altruism can be enforced by internal norms [21–24]. According to the standard
description, in a society, consisting of just two groups, cooperators and defectors, the latter
always outcompete altruists [25]. The cooperation can be stabilized by the punishment of de-
fectors [26–28]. There are, however, examples [29] when punishment decreases cooperation.
While costly punishment, termed altruistic, may facilitate cooperation, at the same time, it
can be interpreted as not so altruistic but rather selfish, because the original motivation behind
punishment could be to retrieve deserved payoffs from their own contributions on the long run,
which is a selfish incentive [30–32]. Punishment can also act indirectly, since the defectors,
outcompeting cooperators inside a society, weaken the competitive ability of the society as a
whole, as is considered in multilevel selection theory [25, 33–36].
The punishment of defectors can be realized directly by other members of the society.
Since the ability of punishing can also be treated as a specific trait or strategy, it can be
associated with a specific group of punishers. This is especially evident in complex societies,
where punishers really form separate groups. For instance, in human societies, punishers are
represented by police, law-enforcing services, and the army, which form what can be called the
punisher group. The consideration of such trait groups does not forbid for the manifolds of
cooperators and punishers to intersect [37, 38].
Sometimes, one considers one more specific trait group whose members are alienated from
the society. The agents of such alienated groups, depending on their particular features, are
termed by different names, as strangers [39], loners [40], outsiders [38], and by other similar
terms. These outsiders do not contribute to the society, but exploit cooperators and are prose-
cuted by punishers. Their difference from defectors is that they enter the society from outside.
There are plenty of examples of such outsiders in biological systems, where they are associated
with pathogens or parasites [41].
The evolution of groups is usually studied within evolutionary game theory [42–45], whose
continuous representation is given by the replicator equation [46–48]
dxi
dt
= (fi − f)xi . (1)
Here xi is the population fraction of group i and fi is the group fitness, and f ≡
∑
i fixi is
the average fitness estimated over all groups. The group fractions are defined on the simplex.
The trait-group fitness is often represented by the quadratic Lande-Arnold form widely used in
describing the evolution of biological species, with the coefficients defined by calibration [49–51].
The most interesting information that can be extracted from this dynamics is the existence
and properties of evolutionary stable strategies related to the stable stationary states of the
dynamical system.
As is evident from the structure of the replicator equation (1), fitness is a quantity inversely
proportional to time. This is concretized in the definition of fitness as being the product of
viability and fecundity rate [52–55]. However, for short, one uses the term fitness, but not
fitness rate. Similarly, below we shall use the term utility, but not utility rate. This will not be
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important for the general consideration, where we shall always employ reduced dimensionless
quantities. But we shall keep this in mind in those concrete cases, where numerical values of
parameters are important.
As said above, if the society consists of two groups only, cooperators (x1) and defectors
(x2), the latter always outperform the former, so that the sole evolutionary stable state is
x∗
1
= 0, x∗
2
= 1. This unrealistic conclusion is caused by a tacit assumption that there exist
unlimited resources supplied from somewhere outside.
Contrary to this, we consider a self-organized society, whose means of survival are those that
are produced inside the society itself. A closed self-organized society cannot exist by just being
composed of defectors because they will have no means for subsistence. To correct such an
unrealistic conclusion, one could introduce punishers. But, from a self-organization view point,
the introduction of punishers is not compulsory since, even without them, defectors cannot
proliferate without bounds because of the lack of resources for their existence [56, 57].
It is necessary to note that the non-survival of cooperators can disappear, when one con-
siders interactions on a network. Thus, computer simulations of cooperator games on lattices
have demonstrated that cooperation can evolve in structural populations when cooperators
interact more frequently with each other than with defectors, and share benefits of mutual co-
operation [58,59], or when individuals interact at different rates with each other by controlling
the frequency distribution of the number of their partners [60, 61]. Cooperators survive on a
network in the presence of modularity describing the separation of the population into clusters
of different traits [62]. High modularity indicates a network with a strong clustered structure,
where the interactions of individuals belonging to different clusters do not occur [63]. Modu-
larity also arises, when the rate of interaction between different groups is not the same for all
groups [63, 64]. Modularity favours cooperation by limiting the interactions of individuals to
the members of the same community [62].
The principal difference between our article and these previous computer simulations is that
we demonstrate analytically and parsimoniously the survival of cooperation without considering
numerical calculations on networks. We show that the finiteness of resources is sufficient to limit
the proliferation of defectors, without the need for heterogeneous interactions and clustering.
While the latter ingredients are certainly relevant in many situations, our focus on the finiteness
of resources is justified because it is often the first and dominant variable influencing population
dynamics.
In the present paper, we combine some of the ideas used in the theory of biological pop-
ulations, system theory, and utility theory and suggest a novel model of group evolution in a
complex self-organized society, which strives to be more realistic than those usually studied in
game theory. The main idea of our approach is in taking into account the bounded rationality
of realistic agents [65,66]. Accordingly, the utility of an agent is not an absolutely fixed notion,
but is instead a relative characteristic defined with respect to the existing constraints. In our
approach, instead of just one utility function for each group, we introduce relative utilities of
a group with respect to the society as a whole as well as mutual utilities with respect to each
other.
As an example, we consider a complex structured society composed of the trait groups repre-
senting four types of typical agents: cooperators, defectors, regulators, and outsiders. Concrete
numerical analysis is given for the societies composed of two groups (cooperators and defec-
tors) and of three groups (cooperators, defectors, and regulators). The role of outsiders will be
studied in a separate publication.
4
Evolution equations
Holistic system-theory approach
As we have emphasized in the Introduction, we follow the ideas underpinning the theory of
systems [1,7–13], whose basic point is the holistic approach for describing systems. Accordingly,
the primary unit is the system as a whole, as opposed to the reductionist approach, where a
system is treated just as a collection of separate parts. In the holistic approach, a system is
considered as a self-regulating organism, whose homeostasis is regulated by the system itself
tending to reach and maintain a stable state. The regulation and control are achieved through
positive and negative feedbacks. This approach is rather general, being applicable to different
systems, physical, chemical, engineering, cybernetic, economic, social, and biological. In the
present subsection, we delineate the main idea of the approach, leaving specifications to the
following subsections.
Suppose that we aim at describing the behavior of a system consisting of several parts that,
e.g., are characterized by fractions xi, with i = 1, 2, . . .. The fractions are the reduced quantities
xi ≡ Ni
N0
, (2)
whose specifications will be given below, and meanwhile their nature is not important, since
the approach can be applied to various particular cases, as is mentioned above.
In the reductionsit approach, one characterises each fraction by its parameters and describes
the system as a collection of equations containing only these parameters specific for separate
fractions. An example of such an approach would apply to the collection of species, each
characterised by its fitness and described by a replicator equation of type (1).
In the holistic system-theory approach, one starts with defining a system functional that
characterises the system as a whole. Actually, this approach is standard and is known to be the
most general and accurate in natural sciences, such as physics or chemistry, where a composite
system is characterized by its energy, free energy, or Hamiltonian defining the system as a
whole. In applied sciences involving control theory, a composite system is characterized by a
cost functional. In economic, social, and financial sciences, it is more customary to characterize
a system by the related utility. All these characteristics, whether energy E, cost functional C,
or utility U are functionals of the system parts, such as the fractions xi depending on time,
xi = xi(t). These characteristics are particular examples of the system functional. Generally,
all of them are proportional to each other, thus, E ∼ C ∼ −U . Therefore, it would be possible
to deal with any of those system functionals. In what follows, keeping in mind biological and
social systems, we prefer to work with the system utility that is a functional U = U({xi}).
Since the variables xi(t) depend on time, this can be called a dynamic utility functional [67].
Equations, describing the behavior of the system parts, in the holistic system-theory ap-
proach, are derived by varying the system functional, such as energy or cost functional. Recall
again that this is the standard way in natural sciences, where the evolution equations for system
parts are obtained through the variation of a system functional, e.g., energy, Hamiltonian, or
Lagrangian. Even the Heisenberg commutator equations can be shown [68] to be equivalent to
variational equations for the total system Hamiltonian.
The system tends to its stable state that requires the increase of its utility. Hence, a fraction
xi increases with time if its variation leads to the increasing system utility. This implies that xi
5
rises when the variational derivative δU/δxi is positive, while xi diminishes with time if δU/δxi
is negative. It is straightforward that this relation, taking into account possible external influxes
Φi, can be represented in the form
dxi
dt
=
δU
δxi
xi + Φi . (3)
A self-regulating system self-organizes through its internal feedbacks, acting so that its
utility would not diminish. Such feedbacks are defined by the linear responses
Ai ≡ lim
{xi→0}
δU
δxi
,
describing the direct influence of the fraction variations on the system utility. From this def-
inition, it is clear that, when the increase of the fraction xi directly results in the increase of
the system utility then, the feedback response Ai is positive. And if the rising xi leads to the
utility decrease, then the response Ai is negative. In addition to the direct influence on the
system utility of the fraction variations, these fractions are correlated with each other through
the correlation matrix, which is proportional to
Aij ≡ lim
{xi→0}
δ2U
δxiδxj
.
By construction, it is symmetric such that Aij = Aji.
From the above discussion, it immediately follows that the general form of the system utility
reads as
U =
∑
i
Aixi +
1
2
∑
ij
Aijxixj . (4)
Again we recall that such a quadratic form is typical for the system energy in natural sciences
or for the cost functional in control theory and engineering applications. It is also worth
mentioning the Lande-Arnold [49–51] quadratic fitness for biological systems. With the system
utility (4), we come to the evolution equations for the fractions:
dxi
dt
= Aixi +
∑
j
Aijxixj + Φi . (5)
We stress that the signs of all parameters are uniquely defined by the conditions of whether
the fraction variations increase or decrease the system utility. Thus, the response Ai is positive
if the increase of the fraction xi increases the system utility, while Ai is negative when the
fraction xi decreases this utility.
In this way, the parameter signs are not artificially chosen but are prescribed by the used
holistic approach. Moreover, it would not be correct to say that the behavior of solutions is
predetermined. Since, for instance, though the feedback of defectors on the society utility is
negative (A2 < 0), but the input of cooperators to the utility of defectors is positive (A21 > 0).
Therefore the actual behavior of the solution describing defectors is not at all predetermined,
but depends on the delicate balance between the values of all system parameters.
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Utility rate equations
Let us now make concrete the general approach, which was described in the previous subsection,
to the case of social and biological systems. We consider a society composed of the trait groups,
or strategy groups, enumerated by an index i = 1, 2, . . ., each consisting of Ni members. Each
group will be characterized by the utility of the group with respect to the whole society and
with respect to other groups. The concrete form of this dependence will be defined below.
In general, there can exist an influx Φi from outside to each group population. Such an
influx can represent, for instance, pathogens or viruses infecting a biological organism. In the
case of social systems, the influx can correspond to foreign invaders and terrorists.
The number of agents in a group can be very large, so that it is standard to consider the
relative fractions xi of the group populations normalized to a constant number N0, as in Eq.
(2). If the total population of all groups would be fixed, it would be possible to interpret the
normalization constant as the total population. However, in general, the group populations
can grow or decay so that the total population is not necessarily fixed. In addition, there can
exist external influxes of populations, not allowing for the conservation of the total population.
Hence, fixing the total population would severely limit the admissible scenarios. However,
it is always possible to choose for the normalization the amount of the total population at
a given time. The most natural way is to accept for the normalization the total population
N0 =
∑
iNi(0) at the initial time t = 0, which therefore sets the scale for the population size.
The total population of any society is certainly finite. In that sense, the variable xi could
be treated as discrete. However, when one considers large societies, as we keep in mind here,
when the population can be of order of many thousands or millions, it is standard to treat xi
as a continuous variable.
In the biological literature, one usually characterizes the species by their fitness. And in the
literature on social systems, one often employs the notion of utility. While the classical economic
approach often defines the utility of an agent as the present value of future consumption, inter-
generational extensions include bequest and the consumption of future generations. It is often
argued that one of the most important measure of success is the passing of genes to future
generation [69,70], so that utility, as a measure of happiness, and fitness, as a measure of success,
become entangled concepts. We prefer to use the term utility, keeping in mind applications to
both biological as well as social systems.
The evolution equations (5) possess the form of the Lotka-Volterra rate equation. However,
the basic novelty of our way is that we employ the system-theory holistic approach, as described
above, which suggests a different interpretation of the coefficients that are defined not by some
interactions between the group members, but by the utility of each group with respect to other
groups and to the whole society. This prescription is important for correctly identifying the
signs of the coefficients. Thus, the term Ai represents the utility of the i-group to the society
as a whole and the terms Aij characterize the mutual utility that the j-th group provides to
the i-th group.
The evolution equations, we have just formulated, are the utility rate equations. For these
equations, the number and signs of the coefficients are uniquely defined by the mutual utility
of the groups, as is explained above.
It is worth emphasizing that the definition of the response Ai as being not purely intrinsic,
but dependent on the relation of the i-th population to the overall system, playing the role of
environment for that population, is not merely admissible, but rather necessary.
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The form of Eq. (5) is typical of many equations employed for describing the evolution
of different biological species, where the role of the rate Ai is played by the species fitness.
As examples, we can mention the replicator equation (1), the Eigen [71, 72] and Crow-Kimura
[73, 74] equations, and other models reviewed in Refs. [75–79].
The population variation rate, as well as fitness, are never completely intrinsic, but strongly
depend on environment carrying capacity, that is, on the available resources, their quantity and
quality [80–83], the existence of other coexisting species [84], and even on the predictability of
environmental changes [85, 86]. The environment essentially influences the species fitness that
can increase or decrease and sometimes unfavorable environments result in the fitness drop and
species extinction [87].
Recall that the general definition of fitness, from the very beginning [88–90], has always been
stressing its dependence on surrounding: ”Fitness is the ability of an organism to survive and
reproduce in the environment, in which it finds itself”. The dependence of the variation rate on
surrounding is common for biological as well as social populations, for which the environment
is given by the overall system, where the population exists [91, 92].
The rate can become purely intrinsic only for an imaginary species called Darwinian Demon,
for which the rate is infinite [93]. But for any real population, the rate always essentially depends
on the environment, where the population exists.
Moreover, the adjustment of each species to their surrounding by varying their fitness, i.e.
the rate, is a basic pillar of the Darwin theory of natural selection, since all organisms tend to
exhibit considerable adaptation to their natural environments [18, 94].
Thus, it is the generally accepted and the sole correct understanding that the population
rate of any real species necessarily depends on environment, that is, on the system, where the
population exists, including all properties of this environment. The population rate cannot be
purely intrinsic, except the fantastic case of Darwinian Demon.
In our case, the role of the rates is played by the responses Ai showing whether the given
fraction increases or decreases the system utility, that is, the sign and value of each Ai are
unambiguously defined by the relative influence of the fraction on the utility of the system
as a whole. This definition immediately follows form the system-theory holistic approach, as
explained above.
Specification of trait groups and utility relations
The above evolution equations can be applied to an arbitrary number of groups of different
nature. In order to concretely demonstrate the validity of the approach, we consider a society
formed by four groups: cooperators, defectors, regulators, and outsiders. These are defined as
follows.
• x1: Cooperators, who contribute to the society, working for the society benefit. In a human
society, the cooperators form the actively working force producing the gross domestic
product, because of which they can also be called producers. In a biological system,
cooperators can be associated with healthy cells.
• x2: Defectors, who, voluntarily or involuntarily, do not contribute to the society, and can
exist only owing to the work of cooperators. In a social system, the groups that benefit
from the society support without contributing are prisoners, pensioners, and unemployed
people. In a biological organism, defectors can be represented by ill cells. Of course, there
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are many degrees interpolating between fully contributing and non-contributing behaviors
and this classification is obviously made for the sake of simplification.
• x3: Regulators, who maintain order in the society and punish defectors and harmful
outsiders. In a human society, this role is played by the police, the army, and the order
enforcing bureaucracy. To support the existence of regulators, the society and cooperators
have to pay the necessary costs. In a biological organism, regulators can correspond to
the cells of the immune system.
• x4: Outsiders, who also exploit the society, as defectors, but with the difference that they
enter the society from outside. These exploiting harmful outsiders should not be confused
with immigrants. The latter, as soon as they become members of the society, separate
into cooperators, defectors, and regulators. The harmful outsiders could be compared
with those terrorists that are supported by external sources. Outsiders could also be
interpreted as foreign raiding groups or even invading armies. For biological organisms,
outsiders could be pathogens or viruses infecting the organism.
This classification uniquely determines the signs of the coefficients entering the evolution
equations (5) as follows. We assume that the external influx can exist only for the outsiders and
is positive (net in-flux). The diagonal terms Aii can describe mutual competition or cooperation.
It is negative in the former case and positive in the latter case. In the presence of a dominant
mutual cooperation, the positivity of the diagonal terms Aii entails the unbounded increase
of the population of the i-group [95, 96]. But, any real system has only finite resources and
it is necessary to take into account competition mechanisms that will eventually dominate to
limit population growth. This means that the diagonal coefficient Aii, in general, could be
described as a function of the population fraction xi, such that it would be positive for small
xi ≪ 1 and changing its sign when xi becomes larger. However, there is the simpler way
to capture this phenomenon without introducing the sign change or higher-order terms with
negative coefficients. This can be done by always considering the diagonal terms Aii as being
negative. Since these terms enter the equations being factorized with x2i , at small xi ≪ 1, such
terms Aiix
2
i do not play an essential role, as compared to the linear terms Aixi. And at larger
xi, the former terms makes it impossible an infinite growth of populations.
In this way, keeping the diagonal terms negative provides mathematically the same effect
as if they would change the sign. Moreover, the existence of competition between members of
a group is a general phenomenon. This is natural even for cooperators, not talking about other
groups. Really, when the number of cooperators would grow without limits, overpassing the
available resources, they would certainly start competing with each other for subsistence. This
does not contradict the fact that they do produce resources for the society. Real cooperators, or
producers, are always of dual nature, from one side, cooperating in the process of production,
but, from the other side, competing for the products.
The signs of all other coefficients are prescribed by the related utilities. Summarizing, we
have the following signs.
Cooperators:
A1 > 0 , A11 < 0 , A12 < 0 ,
A13 < 0 , A14 < 0 , Φ1 = 0 . (6)
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Cooperators are useful for the society, hence A1 > 0. Defectors are not useful for cooperators,
hence A12 < 0. Regulators require the support of cooperators which is a cost to cooperators,
which defines A13 < 0. And harmful insiders also are not useful for cooperators, that is, A14 < 0.
Defectors:
A2 < 0 , A21 > 0 , A22 < 0 ,
A23 < 0 , A24 < 0 , Φ2 = 0 . (7)
The meaning of the chosen signs is again straightforward. Defectors are not useful for the
society, therefore A2 < 0. Cooperators are necessary for defectors who live at the expense of
the former, hence A21 > 0. Regulators suppress and punish defectors, that is, A23 < 0. Invaders
are not useful for defectors, so that A24 < 0.
Regulators:
A3 < 0 , A31 > 0 , A32 > 0 ,
A33 < 0 , A34 > 0 , Φ3 = 0 . (8)
Society needs to support regulators at a cost, thus A3 < 0. Cooperators, contributing to the
society, are necessary for regulators, hence A31 > 0. The role of regulators is to maintain
order and to punish defectors, whose presence justifies the existence of regulators, resulting
in A32 > 0. Similarly, regulators suppress harmful invaders, which justifies the existence of
regulators, giving A34 > 0.
Outsiders:
A4 < 0 , A41 > 0 , A42 > 0 ,
A43 < 0 , A44 < 0 , Φ4 ≥ 0 . (9)
Harmful outsiders are not useful for the society, which means A4 < 0. But cooperators are
necessary for outsiders, hence A41 > 0. To some extent, outsiders exploit defectors by taking a
part of their share, and benefit from their presence, hence A42 > 0. And, of course, regulators,
suppressing outsiders, are not useful to them, which implies A43 < 0. Only outsiders are here
considered to contribute an influx Φ4 to the system.
Let us emphasize that all coefficients above are always treated as the corresponding utilities,
or more precisely, as utility rates. And the variables xi everywhere are the group population
fractions defined in Eq. (2).
In specifying the relations between different groups, we should emphasize the important
symmetry principle [14,15], as a mechanism to ensure the structural stability of the dynamical
system. According to this principle, each term containing Aij, entering the system of equations,
must have its counterpart containing Aji. This principle preserves the action-counteraction
symmetry that is responsible for the system structural stability. Note that the symmetry prin-
ciple does not impose that the matrix {Aij} is symmetric, but just that if Aij 6= 0, then so is
Aji 6= 0. We are not aware of rigorous theorems proving the above claim, but we have observed
its relevance by developing a large number of numerical simulations of multi-dimensional dy-
namical systems [14, 15]. In the construction of the dynamical systems presented here, we use
this structural symmetry principle.
It is worth stressing that the signs of the coefficients are defined by the utility relations
of groups with respect to each other and with respect to the whole society, but not by the
interactions between the members of different groups. Though, in many cases, the signs of
the interactions may be the same as those defined by utilities, but this is not always so. For
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instance, the interaction of cooperators with defectors could produce positive terms propor-
tional to N1N2 in the equation for regulators, implying that this interaction should lead to the
increase of the numbers of regulators. Or, some defectors, and even outsiders, after dealing
with regulators, could become cooperators, which would require to consider positive terms pro-
portional to N2N3 and N4N3 in the cooperator dynamics. It is possible to enumerate a variety
of such admissible interactions. If we would treat the evolution equations as standard rate
equations, whose coefficients are prescribed by interactions, this would make the description
not merely overcomplicated, but also not well defined, because of the great number of all pos-
sible interactions that could be taken into account. In addition, such terms, describing various
possible interactions, could break the action-counteraction symmetry of the system, making
it structurally unstable. Similarly, the coefficient Ai characterizes not the birth-death rate of
the related population but the utility of the corresponding i-th group for the society. This is
why A1 is positive because of the usefulness of cooperators for the society, while A2 and A4 are
negative, since defectors and harmful outsiders exploit the society. Regulators do not produce
goods that would contribute to the society, but require costly support from it, hence A3 is
negative.
The above classification is summarized by the following utility rate evolution equations, in
which the signs of the coefficients are explicitly taken into account. As a result, we come to the
following equations for the cooperators,
dx1
dt
= (A1 − |A11|x1 − |A12|x2 − |A13|x3 − |A14|x4)x1 , (10)
for defectors,
dx2
dt
= (−|A2|+ A21x1 − |A22|x2 − |A23|x3 − |A24|x4)x2 , (11)
for regulators
dx3
dt
= (−|A3|+ A31x1 + A32x2 − |A33|x3 + A34x4)x3 , (12)
and for the outsiders,
dx4
dt
= (−|A4|+ A41x1 + A42x2 − |A43|x3 − |A44|x4) x4 + Φ4 . (13)
All coefficients not bracketed by an absolute value are positive.
Definition of relative utilities
The dimensionless fractions, corresponding to trait groups, are defined as normalized with
respect to the total number of all group agents N0 = N1(0) + N2(0) + N3(0) + N4(0) at the
initial time t = 0. Therefore, the initial conditions for the group population fractions xi(0)
satisfy the equality ∑
i
xi(0) = 1 . (14)
But the values xi(t), as functions of time t, are not generally restricted to a simplex, i.e., their
sum does not necessarily remain exactly equal to 1.
A priori, Eqs. (10) to (13) look rather complicated, containing 20 unknown parameters
representing relative utilities that need to be defined. Strictly speaking, it is possible to consider
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different situations, defining the parameters according to particular situations. Below, we
suggest a general method leading to explicit relations between the parameters, thus essentially
decreasing their number.
First, let us recall that the diagonal quantity Aii has been introduced in order to describe
the competition between members of the same i-group. This is the competition for the available
resources allocated for the particular group. On the other hand, the cost/benefit of an i-group
to the society is given by Ai. Hence, this group competes for the resources Ai allocated to it.
In other words, the amount of resources Ai is proportional to the group carrying capacity. This
implies that the diagonal term Aii, describing the group internal competition, should be taken
as anti-correlated with, or more generally varying inversely to, the carrying capacity |Ai|. A
convenient form is to take Aii as being inversely proportional to |Ai|, so that
|Aii| = C|Ai| ,
where C is a positive constant.
In a self-organized society, the available resources are those that are produced by coopera-
tors, who are the sole net contributors to the society in term of resources and who compete for
these resources. This is equivalent to saying that
|A11| = A1 . (15)
Then, comparing the above two equalities, we get the constant C = A2
1
. From here, we obtain
the general relation for the diagonal terms
|Aii| = A
2
1
|Ai| . (16)
Nondiagonal terms Aij characterize mutual utilities of groups with respect to each other.
There exist several expressions for mutual utilities [97, 98], among which the most symmetric
one is the Bernoulli-Nash mutual utility
|Aij | =
√
|AiAj | , (17)
which we adopt in what follows.
The Bernoulli-Nash mutual utility relates the mutual utility of different groups through
their utility to the society to which they all belong. Different groups influence each other by
influencing the society. For instance, if the i-group is not useful to the society, so that Ai is zero,
then this group is certainly not useful for the j-group, since the latter is part of the same society.
The geometric mean for characterizing the mutual utility automatically ensures these properties
and additionally conserves the dimensionality of all terms involved. Note that this form of the
mutual utility, called the Bernoulli-Nash utility, is often used in various applications [97, 98].
Let us introduce the dimensionless parameters
a ≡ |A2|
A1
, b ≡ |A3|
A1
, c ≡ |A4|
A1
, (18)
quantifying the resources consumed by the corresponding groups, and the dimensionless outsider
influx
ϕ ≡ Φ4
A1N0
, (19)
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all of which are non-negative quantities. And let us measure time in units of 1/A1. Then Eqs.
(10) to (13) reduce to the system of equations
dxi
dt
= fi(x1, x2, x3, x4) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) , (20)
with the right-hand sides
f1 =
(
1− x1 −
√
a x2 −
√
b x3 −
√
c x4
)
x1 , (21)
f2 =
(
−a +√a x1 − 1
a
x2 −
√
ab x3 −
√
ac x4
)
x2 , (22)
f3 =
(
−b+
√
b x1 +
√
ab x2 − 1
b
x3 +
√
bc x4
)
x3 , (23)
f4 =
(
−c +√c x1 +
√
ac x2 −
√
bc x3 − 1
c
x4
)
x4 + ϕ . (24)
These equations are assumed to be complemented by the corresponding initial conditions
xi(0). By definition, the fractions xi are non-negative. Therefore, we shall be looking only for
non-negative solutions of the evolution equations (20) with (21-24).
Evolutionally stable strategies
Single-group evolution
Let us start the analysis with the case where, at the initial time, there is just one group and other
group fractions are set to zero. Suppose, first, that there exists just the group of cooperators.
It follows from Eq. (20) with (21) that the cooperator population is described by the logistic
equation
dx1
dt
= (1− x1)x1 ,
whose solution is
x1(t) =
x1(0)e
t
1 + x1(0)(et − 1) .
Substituting here the initial condition x1(0) = 1 yields x1(t) = 1 for all times t. This is clear
since the initial condition coincides with the stable fixed point x∗
1
= 1. The meaning of this
solution is that cooperators can perfectly exist without other groups.
Let us now consider the population of any other group, except cooperators, as existing alone
at the initial time. For instance, let us take the equation for defectors,
dx2
dt
= −(a + 1
a
x2)x2 ,
with the initial condition x2(0) = 1. The solution is
x2 =
a2
1 + (a2 − 1)eat .
This population decays to zero with time. This is easy to understand as far as defectors do not
produce but merely consume and cannot survive being left alone. The same result holds for
other groups, i.e., for x3 as well as for x4, which cannot survive without cooperators.
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Coexistence of cooperators and defectors
More interesting is the case of two coexisting groups, cooperators and defectors. Actually, this
is the classical situation from which one usually starts analyzing group interactions. In such a
case, Eqs. (20) reduce to two equations
dx1
dt
=
(
1− x1 −
√
a x2
)
x1 ,
dx2
dt
=
(
−a +√a x1 − 1
a
x2
)
x2 . (25)
This system possesses two evolutionary stable states. One is given by the stationary solution
x∗
1
= 1 , x∗
2
= 0 (26)
that is stable when
a > 1 . (27)
The meaning of this state is evident: if defectors attempt to consume more than cooperators
can produce, the stable state can exist only when the very greedy defectors are absent, and
only cooperators live.
Another evolutionary stable state is
x∗
1
=
1 + a5/2
1 + a2
, x∗
2
=
1−√a
1 + a2
a3/2 , (28)
being stable under the condition
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 . (29)
The meaning of this state is again rather clear. When defectors consume only a part of what
is produced by cooperators, they can coexist with them. The dependence of the evolutionary
stable population fractions x∗
1
and x∗
2
, on the amount of the resources a consumed by defectors,
is shown in Fig. 1. The minimal fraction of cooperators happens when
min
a
x∗
1
(a) = 0.940 (a = 0.565) , (30)
while defectors have a maximum
max
a
x∗
2
(a) = 0.083 (a = 0.480) . (31)
These minimum and maximum do not coincide. In a stable society consisting of cooperators
and defectors, the fraction of defectors cannot overpass the limit of order 10%.
These logical conclusions are drastically different from the result of the replicator equa-
tion for the case of two coexisting groups (cooperators and defectors), which predicts that the
sole stable state consists solely of defectors, without any cooperators. Such a state is obvi-
ously impossible in a self-organized society since, without cooperators, nothing is produced and
defectors would have no means for survival.
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Coexistence of three groups
Let us now consider a society formed by three trait groups, cooperators, defectors, and regula-
tors. The evolution equations (20) form a three-dimensional dynamical system
dx1
dt
=
(
1− x1 −
√
a x2 −
√
b x3
)
x1 ,
dx2
dt
=
(
−a +√a x1 − 1
a
x2 −
√
ab x3
)
x2 ,
dx3
dt
=
(
−b+
√
b x1 +
√
ab x2 − 1
b
x3
)
x3 . (32)
Looking for stationary solutions, we select positive and stable fixed points, employing the
standard Lyapunov analysis. The system possesses four types of evolutionary stable solutions.
The first stable state is given by the fixed point
x∗
1
=
1 + a2b2 + a5/2(1 + b2) + b5/2(1− a2)
(1 + a2)(1 + b2)
,
x∗
2
=
1−√a(1 + b2)− b2(1− 2√b)
(1 + a2)(1 + b2)
a3/2 , x∗
3
=
1−√b
1 + b2
b3/2 , (33)
which is stable under the conditions
0 ≤ a <
(
2b2
√
b− b2 + 1
1 + b2
)2
, 0 ≤ b < 1 . (34)
This stable state occurs when defectors and regulators consume reasonable amount of the
resources of the society, so that all three groups can coexist.
The second stable state corresponds to the solution
x∗
1
=
1 + b5/2
1 + b2
, x∗
2
= 0 , x∗
3
=
1−√b
1 + b2
b3/2 , (35)
being stable when
a ≥
(
2b2
√
b− b2 + 1
1 + b2
)2
, 0 ≤ b < 1 . (36)
Here, the defectors, who consume too much die out, while cooperators and regulators coexist
with each other.
The third stationary solution is
x∗
1
=
1 + a5/2
1 + a2
, x∗
2
=
1−√a
1 + a2
a3/2 , x∗
3
= 0, (37)
which is stable if
0 < a < 1 , b > 1 . (38)
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In this case, the excessive consumption (or cost) of regulators makes them unprofitable for the
society, so that they are suppressed to zero, while defectors who are not too greedy remain
viable at an optimal finite fraction x∗
2
.
Finally, the fourth state is described by the set
x∗
1
= 1 , x∗
2
= 0 , x∗
3
= 0 , (39)
which is stable provided that
a ≥ 1 , b ≥ 1 . (40)
The meaning of this solution is again clear. Defectors and regulators, trying to consume more
than what the cooperators produce constitute an unsustainable burden for the society, which
prefers to eliminate them.
The phase portrait for the case of three coexisting groups is shown in Fig. 2. Figure 3 shows
the dependence of the evolutionary stable cooperator fraction x∗
1
as a function of the amount
of the resources consumed by defectors (a) and regulators (b). The function x∗
1
has a global
minimum
min
a,b
x∗
1
= 0.905 (a = 0.456 , b = 0.565) . (41)
The evolutionary stable fraction of defectors x∗
2
is shown in Fig. 4 as a function of a and b.
This function enjoys a global maximum
max
a,b
x∗
2
= 0.083 (a = 0.480) , (42)
when either b = 0 or b ≥ 1. The stable fraction of regulators x∗
3
is presented in Fig. 5. This
function has a global maximum
max
a,b
x∗
3
= 0.083 (a ≥ 0 , b = 0.480) . (43)
These results show in particular that, in order to achieve an evolutionary stable state in a
self-organized society, the fractions of defectors and regulators should not exceed about 10%
each.
Applications to biological and human societies
Biological societies without defectors
As follows from the above analysis, there can exist societies with no defectors. A good example
of this is a bee colony. A honey bee colony typically consists of three kinds of adult bees:
workers, drones, and a queen [99]. Several thousand worker bees cooperate in nest building,
food collection, and brood rearing. Each member has a definite task to perform, related to
its adult age. But surviving and reproducing take the combined efforts of the entire colony.
Individual bees (workers, drones, and queens) cannot survive without the support of the colony.
Even drones (males honey bees) are necessary members of the colony. In that sense, all bees
are cooperators, having no defectors. They also do not have separate groups of regulators or
defenders. Each bee perfectly knows its task. And in the case of danger, all bees defend their
hive. But, excluding the cases of external aggression, in the normal situation, the bee colony
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is an example of a society where practically all members are cooperators. As an extreme,
drones which are useful mainly in mating are expendable members of the colony, driven from
the colony as winter approaches where they perish from cold and starvation. This mechanism
removes defectors, in the sense defined in our model.
Another example of a biological society without defectors is a colony of ants. The colony
is typically divided into the following castes, or classes: queens (reproductive females), males,
and workers (nonreproductive females). Although there are great variations in social structure
among ant colonies, the basic features are common to most species [100]. There are no defectors
in an ant colony, all ants accomplish a job contributed to the whole group. Often, one classifies
the workers into two castes, minor workers and major workers, or soldiers. However, this is
done on the basis of the difference in their sizes, but does not mean that the sole job of soldiers
is defending the nest, as they do accomplish other jobs [101–103]. All workers participate in
the defense when necessary, though soldiers may do this more often. But soldiers also take part
in other numerous acts, such as foraging food, taking care of larva, carrying dead nestmates,
and so on [100, 104–106]. So, strictly speaking, soldiers are just bigger working ants. For this
reason, they also are called foragers since, being bigger, they can carry heavier pieces of food.
In order to perform a quantitative comparison with our theory, we consider the ratio of the
number of foragers (NF ) to the number of other working ants (NW ), which is termed the cast
ratio, r ≡ NF/NW . The fraction of foragers with respect to the total population is then
NF
NF +NW
=
r
r + 1
. (44)
Defense is a part of the labor repertory, which can be denoted as δ. Then, the fraction of the
defense trait reads as
x3 =
r
1 + r
δ . (45)
Recall that defenders are a part of the group of regulators.
The caste ratio of ants has been investigated in numerous articles (see the literature cited
above and references therein). This ratio can vary in a wide range, depending on the colony
age, time of the season, external danger, climate, and so on. To get estimates, it is reasonable
to consider average numbers. Thus, the average caste ratio, measured for 503 colonies by
Kaspari and Byrne [102], was found to be r = 0.11, which gives the fraction of foragers 0.099.
The repertory of ant labor has been intensively studied by Wilson [104, 105] and Oster and
Wilson [100], who define the fraction of the defense behavior of foragers, among the total
number of their acts, as δ = 0.345. These data give the fraction of the defense trait (45) as
x3 = 0.034. This value is nicely compatible with our estimate requiring that the maximal
fraction of regulators in stable equilibrium should not be larger than x∗
3
= 0.08.
One can thus consider an ant colony as a society with two trait groups, cooperators and
regulators (soldiers). It seems that defectors rarely occur among social insects, such as bees,
wasps, ants and termites. This is probably due to the strong selection pressure acting on these
specific biological species, so that costly defectors are selected out. Defense is often necessary
and one does find a non-zero defense trait group in an ant colony. But defense is in this case
principally directed to external aggressions, in particular against other foreign ants for ant
colonies, and occupies a rather small fraction of the population, as predicted by our model.
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Classification by distance from equilibrium
In real life, no society can be considered to be in an absolute stable equilibrium. Hence, we do
not expect any society to lie exactly at or even close to any of the equilibrium points described
above, either because of the previous history or because of external influences that may prevent
the dynamics to have sufficient time to converge to the corresponding equilibrium point. How
can we then characterize the relative stabilities of different societies and distinguish between
them?
To answer this question, we propose to introduce the distance from equilibrium
D(t) ≡
√
(x1(t)− x∗1)2 + (x2(t)− x∗2)2 + (x3(t)− x∗3)2 , (46)
and use this metric to classify societies in terms of their relative stability, according to whether
they are further or closer to an equilibrium state.
Application to human populations
In order to show that the proposed approach yields not merely qualitatively reasonable results,
but also provides a realistic quantitative picture, let us consider the social systems represented
by populations of different countries. Then, the fraction of cooperators x1 describes the active
working part of the society, producing all resources. As defectors (x2), we count the fraction
that does not take a direct part in the production of goods, but is supported by the society;
these are unemployed people, pensioners, and prisoners. Regulators (x3) are police, army, and
law-enforcing bureaucrats.
To define the parameters a and b, we resort to the analogy between human and biological
societies. These parameters are defined in Eq. (18) through the quantities Ai that symbolize
the utilities of the related groups. Recall that utility for a human society is equivalent to fitness
for a biological society. In biology, fitness is defined as the product of viability and fecundity
rate [52–55]. Viability is the capacity for survival of a group [55], while the fecundity rate or
potential reproductive capacity rate [52] is the number of offsprings produced by an organism
per unit time.
Similarly, we define the utility Ai as the product Ai = CiGi of the capacity Ci available
to a group for its survival and of the growth rate Gi characterizing the relative group growth
or its potential growth due to the increasing capacity. In human societies, the growth of a
group is usually proportional to the increase of the resources provided to this group [107–110].
Conversely, increasing the group resources provides means for the potential group growth. In
this way, the parameters a and b are defined as the ratios
a ≡ |A2|
A1
=
|C2|G2
|C1|G1 , b ≡
|A3|
A1
=
|C3|G3
|C1|G1 . (47)
In more or less stable countries, the growth rate of the total resources produced by coop-
erators is assumed to coincide with the growth rates of the resources available for each group.
Then, the system parameters become a = |C2|/C1 and b = |C3|/C1. This is probably not
always the case, and some groups can grow faster than others. An example could be the bu-
reaucracy in Russia, which grows much faster than the country GDP. Another example may be
the accelerated growth of the weight in percentage of GDP of government spending in western
countries, including the US, as a reaction to the great recession that started in 2008. In many
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countries, the growth of spending programs, such as in Japan in the mid-1990s, or in health
care, also grow faster than GDP. However here, for simplicity, we assume that the growth rates
of the different groups are proportional to GDP, leaving the fine structure related to the possible
unbalance between the growth rates for future economical investigations.
Within this assumption leading to a = |C2|/C1 and b = |C3|/C1, the parameter a charac-
terizes the portion of the resources, that is of the budget, the society pays for supporting the
defectors, while b is the portion of the budget spent for the regulators. All these data can be
found on the websites provided at the end of the list of References.
Note that different Internet sources, even the official ones, quite often give different infor-
mation on a country total population, labor force, employment, number of military or police
forces, and so on. We have used the data for 2008, since only those data were presented in
the most complete and uniform way for the chosen countries. In those cases where we could
not find the appropriate data for 2008, we used the information for the nearest available year.
It was possible to do so because there were no sharp changes in numbers for adjacent years.
The differences in data should provide only small deviations in initial conditions or parameters
and, because of the structural stability of the system (32), it should not drastically change the
results. For example, to estimate the number of retired people in France, we used the data from
the population pyramid of France for 2010, instead for 2008, to be able to take into account
early retirements.
We do not expect any country to lie exactly at or even close to any of the equilibrium
points described above, because there always exist changes of conditions at the geopolitical
and economic levels that may prevent the dynamics to have sufficient time to converge to the
corresponding equilibrium point. We use the distance from equilibrium (46) as the metric to
classify the societies in terms of their relative stability, according to whether they are further
or closer to an equilibrium state.
The initial values and parameters entering the system of equations (32) are taken from the
data characterizing the corresponding countries. All these data can be found on the websites
[111, 112]. For example, we illustrate below the case of Israel [111], explaining how the data,
characterizing the considered countries, have been estimated.
The total population of Israel in 2008 is estimated as 7.34 M. According to our definition,
defectors are assumed to constitute the part of the population that does not contribute to
the society, but instead is supported by it. These are pensioners, unemployed, and prisoners.
Pensioners compose 9.8% of the total population.
The labor force of Israel in 2008 is estimated as 2.96 M people. Unemployment rate is 6.1%
of its labor force, which equals 0.18 M of the total population of Israel. Hence, the percentage
of unemployed with respect to the total population is 2.46%.
The number of prisoners in Israel in 2008 is 0.013 M, which gives 0.177% of the total
population. Thus the percentage of defectors is evaluated, in total, as 9.8%+2.46%+0.177% =
12.4%, which gives x2 = 0.124.
The group of regulators is formed by the army, police, and bureaucrats. The army is strong
of 0.185 M persons and the police has a force of 0.035 M people. This gives the total number of
the population in the army and police as 0.22 M. In other terms, the army and police compose
3% of the total population.
The number of bureaucrats makes 16.5% of the labour force of 2.96 M. This gives the
total number of bureaucrats in the country as 0.488 M. So, the percentage of bureaucrats with
respect to the total population is 6.65% . Therefore the fraction of regulators x3 is evaluated
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as 6.65% + 3% = 9.65%, which gives x3 = 0.097.
The fraction of cooperators, x1, at the given initial time, is calculated as x1 = 1−(x2+x3) =
1− (0.124 + 0.097) = 0.779. Note that this is different from the employed productive fraction,
as we include all the children, who arguably grow human capital, and people working at home
(housewives for instance) who do not appear in the unemployed statistics but nevertheless
contribute to the production of the country.
The parameter a is the cost of the group x2 for the group x1, and the parameter b is the
cost of the group x3 for the group x1. We consider a as the part of the budget spent on social
protection. In 2008, Israel spent on social protection 25.5% of the budget, which means that
a = 0.255.
On national defense, public order and safety, and state governing, Israel spent respectively
16.4%, 3.8%, and 12.7% of its total budget. In total, it thus gives 32.9%, hence b = 0.329.
In this way, analyzing the system of equation (32) for Israel, we employ the found param-
eter values a = 0.255 and b = 0.329, and take as initial conditions x1(0) = 0.779, x2(0) =
0.124, x3(0) = 0.097.
We have followed the same procedure for the other nine countries. All data are taken from
the websites [112].
As shown in the Table 1, we find for the ten analyzed countries that they all lie in the
domain I of the phase portrait depicted in Fig. 2, for which there is a stable fixed point with a
finite fraction of all three groups of cooperators, defectors and regulators. This is not surprising,
since the common structure of all countries always includes these three groups. We are not
aware of countries that would not contain some of these groups. This is in contrast to social
insect colonies, for which defectors are too costly and rarely exist, as discussed for the cases of
bee and ant colonies.
The real value of the metric (46) rests in the possibility to quantify how far from their
corresponding equilibrium point is each country, given its corresponding loss a due to defectors
and cost b of regulators. In order to understand the meaning of the Table 1, one could interpret
the coefficients a and b for each country as reflecting the choice of the society, for instance
through evolution and/or a political process. In other words, we interpret the parameters
a and b measured for each country as the independent variables determined by the society.
Then, given the set a and b, our theory predicts what should be the optimal fraction of the
three groups of cooperators, defectors and regulators, where optimality is referring to maximum
stability. Another possible interpretation is that the distance D defined by (46) for each country
quantifies a prediction of a future probable evolution of the three groups, if the relative losses
a associated with defectors and costs b of regulators remain unchanged. Indeed, being at a
distance to the stable fixed point, a given country is expected to see its population partition in
the three groups to evolve towards the fractions given by the values of the stable fixed points for
the measured a and b. We are, of course aware that this may not happen, since the parameters
a and b can be varied because of political reasons and technology changes.
Let us mention that it could be possible to consider the deviations from the stationary
states for each of the variables x1, x2, x3 separately. This would show the relative instability
of the country with respect to the particular characteristics. However, the overall stability is
connected with all three deviations, since it is possible to compensate one large deviation by
other deviations. Although the consideration of partial separate deviations is admissible, here
we limit ourselves to the analysis of the global deviation D(t).
Some interesting features are worth noting. For all countries, there are not sufficiently many
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cooperators, too many defectors and too many regulators, compared to the normative values
associated with the stable equilibrium points. This suggests that societies choose to allocate
their resources in a way that is suboptimal with respect to stability, considering other factors
such as social preferences as well as historical culture, a hardly surprising observation. As a con-
sequence, the possibility for changes and instabilities in the presence of external perturbations
should not be underestimated, since it results from the fundamental choice taken consciously
or through the force of history to function far from the stability point.
It may be surprising to find Israel at the top of the ranking. One could advance the
interpretation that its special geopolitical situation has forced it to evolve closer to a regime of
structural stability. Other countries in the West may have, at least for a while, the luxury to
choose less stable policies.
Another interesting point is made by comparing Switzerland with USA and Spain. While
the cost of defectors (main social and retirement costs) is much higher in Switzerland than in
the USA (a = 0.407 compared with 0.19), Switzerland is ranked higher (more stable) than the
USA because it has a much lower cost for regulators (b = 0.197 compared with 0.304 reflecting
its much smaller relative military budget), confirmed by its smaller fraction of regulators. In
contrast, Spain has lower costs from defectors and for regulators than Switzerland, but more
defectors and almost twice as many regulators, hence its relatively much lower rank.
The laggard of the list is Russia. Examining its parameters (a, b) and its three group
fractions (x1, x2, x3), it is clear that its woes are rooted in the combination of having the smallest
number of cooperators and the largest number of defectors, as well as the largest number of
regulators. This points clearly to the general directions of reforms that could improve its state.
Finally, it is quite remarkable that the classification of countries presented in the Table,
in terms of their distance from equilibrium, is in excellent agreement with the general under-
standing about their respective economic stability. It is particularly interesting that, for the
European countries, the ranking shown in the Table coincides with the ranking in terms of GDP
per capita given by the International Monetary Fund, which can be found on the site [113].
Dynamics in presence of noise
Real societies can never reach their absolute equilibrium states because of the everlasting exis-
tence of external perturbations, which can be modeled as a kind of noise superimposed on the
deterministic dynamics that we have considered until now. To investigate the consequence of
such a noise, we have studied the behavior of the population fractions as functions of time in
the presence of random perturbations that are modeled by adding to the evolution equations
(20) Gaussian white noise characterized by the standard deviation σ. Then, each population
fraction obeys the equation
xi(tn +∆t)− xi(tn) = fi(tn)∆t + σ
√
∆t R(tn) , (48)
where R(tn) are random numbers, ∆t, a small time interval, tn = n∆t, and n = 1, 2, . . ..
For illustration, we take the data corresponding to Israel. The resulting temporal behavior
of group fractions is shown in Figs. 6 to 8. From these figures, it is seen that, in the presence
of external perturbations, even a rather stable country, such as Israel, from time to time may
experience quite strong deviations far from equilibrium.
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Conclusion
A novel approach has been suggested for describing the evolution of self-organized structured so-
cieties composed of several trait groups. The main idea is to consider the utility rate equations,
whose parameters are characterized by the utility of each group with respect to the society as
a whole and by the mutual utilities of groups with respect to each other.
The principal point is that we consider self-organized societies whose resources are those
produced by the societies themselves.
We have analyzed in detail the cases of two coexisting groups (cooperators and defectors)
and of three groups (cooperators, defectors, and regulators). In a self-organized society, neither
defectors nor regulators can overpass the maximal fractions of order 10%. This is in contrast
with the standard replicator equation, where defectors can overpass the amount of cooperators,
if no regulators or punishers are present.
According to the studied equations, there can exist societies without defectors. Examples
of such societies are rather common for biological species. For instance, there are no defectors
in bee or ant colonies.
It is numerically demonstrated that the suggested approach, though being relatively simple,
gives reasonable results when applied to ten countries, from Israel to Russia. We have shown
in particular how the ranking of countries in terms of the distance to their corresponding stable
equilibrium point is in remarkable concordance with more standard economic ranking based,
for instance, on GDP per capita.
A possible generalization of the evolution equations can be done by considering the society
behavior during long time periods, when the system parameters a and b become functions of
time. For example, the amount of the resources produced by cooperators in the long run can be
taken as a function of time, similarly to the time dependence of the carrying capacity studied
in other models [95, 114, 115]. In contrast, as has been explained in the Introduction, we have
considered here the intermediate time scales lying between the short times of the interactions
among the group members and the large scale of the system lifetime.
In the present paper, we have limited our considerations to the case of closed societies, when
there are no invaders from outside. For social systems, such invaders could be associated with
terrorists or foreign armies, invading the assembly of cooperators, defectors, and regulators.
For biological systems, these invaders could correspond to viruses and pathogens penetrating a
biological organism formed of healthy cells (cooperators), ill cells (defectors), and the cells of
immune system (regulators). The role of such invaders will be studied in a separate publication.
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Figure Legends
Fig. 1. Evolutionary stable fractions of cooperators x∗
1
(solid line) and defectors x∗
2
(dashed
line) as functions of the relative amount of resources a consumed by defectors, in the case of
the coexistence of two trait groups, cooperators and defectors.
Fig. 2. Phase portrait for the evolutionary stable states in the case of three coexisting trait
groups, cooperators, defectors, and regulators on the plane of the relative amount of resources
consumed by defectors (a) and regulators (b). In region I, all three groups coexist, having
nonzero fractions. In region II, there exist only cooperators and regulators, while there are no
defectors (x∗
2
= 0). In region III, cooperators and defectors coexist, but there are no regulators
(x∗
3
= 0). In region IV, only cooperators are present, without either defectors or regulators
(x∗
2
= 0, x∗
3
= 0).
Fig. 3. Evolutionary stable fraction of cooperators x∗
1
as a function of the parameters a and b.
Fig. 4. Evolutionary stable fraction of defectors x∗
2
as a function of the parameters a and b.
Fig. 5. Evolutionary stable fraction of regulators x∗
3
as a function of the parameters a and b.
Fig. 6. Temporal behavior of the cooperator fraction x1 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
Fig. 7. Temporal behavior of the defector fraction x2 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
Fig. 8. Temporal behavior of the regulator fraction x3 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
30
Tables
Table 1: Data for different countries corresponding to the present fractions of cooperators
x1, defectors x2, and regulators x3, compared to their stable stationary solutions (given in
brackets). The portion of the budget, consumed by defectors is a and the relative amount
spent for regulators is b. Countries are classified according to their distance D from equilibrium
defined by expression (46).
D a b x1 (x
∗
1
) x2 (x
∗
2
) x3 (x
∗
3
)
1. Israel 0.173 0.255 0.329 0.779 (0.933) 0.124 (0.050) 0.097 (0.073)
2. Japan 0.203 0.350 0.192 0.761 (0.940) 0.157 (0.068) 0.082 (0.046)
3. Switzerland 0.217 0.407 0.197 0.750 (0.934) 0.186 (0.071) 0.064 (0.047)
4. USA 0.242 0.190 0.304 0.740 (0.945) 0.167 (0.039) 0.082 (0.069)
5. Germany 0.282 0.451 0.196 0.704 (0.919) 0.240 (0.072) 0.056 (0.047)
6. France 0.284 0.414 0.193 0.690 (0.934) 0.205 (0.072) 0.105 (0.046)
7. Italy 0.286 0.385 0.250 0.697 (0.929) 0.233 (0.067) 0.070 (0.059)
8. Spain 0.304 0.340 0.187 0.691 (0.942) 0.238 (0.067) 0.071 (0.044)
9. Greece 0.314 0.365 0.294 0.665 (0.926) 0.234 (0.063) 0.101 (0.067)
10. Russia 0.471 0.363 0.225 0.546 (0.934) 0.322 (0.067) 0.132 (0.053)
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Figure 1: Evolutionary stable fractions of cooperators x∗
1
(solid line) and defectors x∗
2
(dashed
line) as functions of the relative amount of resources a consumed by defectors, in the case of
the coexistence of two trait groups, cooperators and defectors.
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Figure 2: Phase portrait for the evolutionary stable states in the case of three coexisting trait
groups, cooperators, defectors, and regulators on the plane of the relative amount of resources
consumed by defectors (a) and regulators (b). In region I, all three groups coexist, having
nonzero fractions. In region II, there exist only cooperators and regulators, while there are no
defectors (x∗
2
= 0). In region III, cooperators and defectors coexist, but there are no regulators
(x∗
3
= 0). In region IV, only cooperators are present, without either defectors or regulators
(x∗
2
= 0, x∗
3
= 0).
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 Figure 3: Evolutionary stable fraction of cooperators x∗
1
as a function of the parameters a and
b.
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Figure 4: Evolutionary stable fraction of defectors x∗
2
as a function of the parameters a and b.
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 Figure 5: Evolutionary stable fraction of regulators x∗
3
as a function of the parameters a and b.
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Figure 6: Temporal behavior of the cooperator fraction x1 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
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Figure 7: Temporal behavior of the defector fraction x2 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
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Figure 8: Temporal behavior of the regulator fraction x3 in the presence of noise of different
intensity for the parameters a = 0.26, b = 0.33 corresponding to Israel: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.03;
(c) σ = 0.06; (d) σ = 0.09.
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